HR can now delete a history entry, but only where deleting one is an
honest thing to do — and deleting it also undoes it.
The rule they asked for is the interesting part: the last valid change
wins. Deleting an entry walks its fields one at a time. If a later entry
touched the same field, the current value stays — that later change is
the one in force. Otherwise the field goes back to what the deleted
entry recorded as its "before". So the middle of three entries can be
removed without an old value overwriting a newer one.
Four kinds of entry refuse to be deleted, each saying why in the place
the button would have been. Eintritt anchors the timeline. Transfers,
promotions, absences and exits moved positions and status — they have
proper operations for that, and guessing backwards is how you corrupt an
org chart. Anything not yet effective hangs off a planned change, and
that link is not trustworthy: there is no key between a history row and
its pending row, only a person and a date, and the data already has an
Eintritt and a Vertragsänderung sharing one. Matching on the date would
eventually cancel a change nobody meant. And entries from before the
history carried values have nothing to fall back to.
Confirmation is not "are you sure" — that question gets a reflex yes by
the third time. The dialog says what will be different afterwards: which
field goes back to which value, and which one stays because something
later claimed it.
employee_history keeps its append-only policies; delete_history_entry is
SECURITY DEFINER and checks the permission itself in its first line. The
audit log keeps the deletion with the values that were removed, and the
audit log genuinely cannot be edited.
The rule lives twice — in SQL and in lib/history.ts. The database is the
authority; the copy exists so the UI can hide a button that would fail
and print the reason instead. Rehearsed against real data in a
rolled-back transaction first: the later change held, the untouched
field reverted, all four refusals fired.
Also corrected in the data catalogue: I had written that
require_hr_admin was called by nothing. It guards all sixteen mutating
functions.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The one document describing the schema, docs/data-model.md, predates two
rebuilds. It names divisions/departments/teams and a positions table that
no longer exist, describes Supabase auth with an anon key and a service
role that were removed, and puts the policy count at 58 when it is 21.
Anyone reading it to understand the data would have been misled on every
count.
docs/datenkatalog.md replaces it, and was not typed up from memory: the
columns, defaults, keys and check constraints were read out of
information_schema and pg_catalog on the running database. Fifteen
tables, 142 columns, ten enum types, 21 policies. Where a rule appears in
prose, the constraint it comes from is named next to it.
Some of it only became visible by asking the database rather than the
migrations. generate_company_email and the is_hr_admin pair are still
defined but nothing calls them any more. Position numbers look like a
six followed by seven digits because the generator builds them that way,
not because anything enforces it — the column requires only uniqueness.
monthly_salary_gross is dead weight kept in case old rows hold data.
Three claims I drafted were wrong and the database said so: the position
number format, the event trigger's name (ensure_rls, the function behind
it is rls_auto_enable), and which tables deviate from the plain
is_hr_user() policy.
The old document keeps a pointer at the top instead of being deleted —
it is linked from the security review, and a stale document that says so
is more useful than a dead link.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
