alpenwerk-hr/tests/unit/security.test.ts

import { NextRequest } from "next/server";
import { afterEach, describe, expect, it, vi } from "vitest";
import { exportFilename, sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell, toCsv } from "@/lib/export";
import {
  parseEventDateParam,
  parseEventType,
  parseGroupDimension,
  parseIsoDateParam,
  parseMeasure,
  parseSplitDimension,
} from "@/lib/reports";

// Die Cron-Route lädt lib/db, das über `import "server-only"` abgesichert
// ist und beim Laden eine DATABASE_URL verlangt — beides gibt es unter
// reinem Vitest nicht. Weggemockt: geprüft wird hier nur der
// Geheimnis-Abgleich, der zurückkehrt, bevor irgendeine Verbindung
// entsteht.
// `import "server-only"` wirft ausserhalb der Server-Übersetzung von Next —
// also auch hier. Der Riegel ist im Betrieb richtig; für den Test wird das
// Modul zu einer leeren Hülle.
vi.mock("server-only", () => ({}));
vi.mock("@/lib/db", () => ({ asSystem: vi.fn(), withUser: vi.fn() }));
vi.mock("@/lib/db/rpc", () => ({ callFunction: vi.fn() }));

describe("sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell", () => {
  it("prefixes values that would be read as a formula by Excel/Sheets", () => {
    expect(sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell("=SUM(A1:A2)")).toBe("'=SUM(A1:A2)");
    expect(sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell("+1234")).toBe("'+1234");
    expect(sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell("-1234")).toBe("'-1234");
    expect(sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell("@cmd")).toBe("'@cmd");
  });

  it("leaves ordinary text untouched", () => {
    expect(sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell("Gruber")).toBe("Gruber");
    expect(sanitizeForSpreadsheetCell("Hauptstraße 1, 1200 Wien")).toBe("Hauptstraße 1, 1200 Wien");
  });

  it("toCsv escapes a formula-injection payload in a row value", () => {
    const csv = toCsv([{ name: "=cmd|'/c calc'!A1" }], [{ header: "Name", get: (r: { name: string }) => r.name }]);
    expect(csv).toContain("'=cmd");
  });
});

// Der Test zu sanitizeIlikeTerm ist entfallen, weil die Funktion es ist.
// Sie entschärfte Zeichen, die in der Filtersyntax der alten API-Schicht
// strukturelle Bedeutung hatten. Am direkten Datenbankzugang wird der
// Suchbegriff als Parameter gebunden — ein Komma oder eine Klammer darin
// ist schlicht ein Zeichen. Die Lücke ist nicht abgesichert, sondern weg.

describe("report query-string parsing", () => {
  it("falls back to a known dimension instead of passing an unknown one through", () => {
    expect(parseMeasure("bogus")).toBe("headcount");
    expect(parseGroupDimension("bogus")).toBe("division");
    expect(parseMeasure("fte")).toBe("fte");
    expect(parseGroupDimension("weekday")).toBe("weekday");
  });

  it("treats an unknown split or event type as 'none' rather than a value", () => {
    expect(parseSplitDimension("bogus")).toBeNull();
    expect(parseSplitDimension("")).toBeNull();
    expect(parseSplitDimension("location")).toBe("location");
    expect(parseEventType("bogus")).toBeNull();
    expect(parseEventType("Eintritt")).toBe("Eintritt");
  });

  // Object.hasOwn, not `in`: a plain `value in LABELS` check would accept
  // "constructor" or "toString" off the prototype chain as a valid dimension.
  it("does not accept inherited Object properties as dimensions", () => {
    expect(parseGroupDimension("constructor")).toBe("division");
    expect(parseSplitDimension("toString")).toBeNull();
    expect(parseEventType("hasOwnProperty")).toBeNull();
  });

  it("rejects a Stichtag that is not a real calendar date", () => {
    expect(parseIsoDateParam("2026-03-05")).toBe("2026-03-05");
    expect(parseIsoDateParam("2026-02-30")).toBeUndefined();
    expect(parseIsoDateParam("heute")).toBeUndefined();
    expect(parseIsoDateParam('2026-03-05"; rm -rf /')).toBeUndefined();
  });

  it("keeps the open-interval sentinel but still rejects free text", () => {
    expect(parseEventDateParam("open")).toBe("open");
    expect(parseEventDateParam("2026-01-01")).toBe("2026-01-01");
    expect(parseEventDateParam("whenever")).toBeUndefined();
  });
});

describe("exportFilename", () => {
  // The base is assembled from query-string values and lands in a
  // Content-Disposition header, so a quote in it would otherwise break out
  // of the quoted filename.
  it("strips characters that would escape the Content-Disposition filename", () => {
    const name = exportFilename('bericht"; attachment; filename="evil', "csv");
    expect(name).not.toContain('"');
    expect(name).not.toContain(";");
    expect(name.endsWith(".csv")).toBe(true);
  });

  it("keeps an ordinary base readable", () => {
    expect(exportFilename("bericht-headcount-division", "xlsx")).toMatch(/^bericht-headcount-division-\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}\.xlsx$/);
  });
});

describe("cron auth guard (/api/cron/apply-pending-changes)", () => {
  afterEach(() => {
    vi.unstubAllEnvs();
  });

  async function callCronRoute(authorization?: string) {
    // The route reads process.env.CRON_SECRET inside the handler on every
    // request (not at module load time), so importing it once and reusing
    // it across the stubbed-env cases below is safe.
    const { GET } = await import("@/app/api/cron/apply-pending-changes/route");
    const headers = new Headers();
    if (authorization !== undefined) headers.set("authorization", authorization);
    const request = new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/cron/apply-pending-changes", { headers });
    return GET(request);
  }

  it("rejects the request when CRON_SECRET is not configured, even with a matching-looking header", async () => {
    vi.stubEnv("CRON_SECRET", "");
    const res = await callCronRoute("Bearer ");
    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
  });

  it("rejects a request with no Authorization header", async () => {
    vi.stubEnv("CRON_SECRET", "test-secret");
    const res = await callCronRoute(undefined);
    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
  });

  it("rejects a request with the wrong bearer token", async () => {
    vi.stubEnv("CRON_SECRET", "test-secret");
    const res = await callCronRoute("Bearer wrong-value");
    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
  });
});

describe("protected export route without a session (/api/export/employees)", () => {
  it("returns 401 instead of running the query when there is no authenticated user", async () => {
    // Gestellt wird die Sitzung, nicht die Datenbank: die Route muss mit 401
    // antworten, *bevor* sie eine Verbindung aufbaut. Käme sie bis zur
    // Abfrage, liefe der Test ohne DATABASE_URL in einen Verbindungsfehler
    // statt in die Zusicherung — und bewiese nichts.
    vi.doMock("@/auth", () => ({ auth: async () => null }));
    const { GET } = await import("@/app/api/export/employees/route");
    const request = new NextRequest("http://localhost/api/export/employees");
    const res = await GET(request);
    expect(res.status).toBe(401);
    vi.doUnmock("@/auth");
  });
});