Yesterday's version had it the other way — everyone visible, untick to
hide. The decision from the business side is the opposite: you see your
own notes, and you tick the colleagues you also want. So note_mutes
becomes note_subscriptions and the predicate flips from `not exists` to
`exists`.
The existing rows are not carried over. The meaning inverts rather than
the sign: converting faithfully ("everyone except the muted") would write
almost the whole roster into the new table and reproduce exactly the state
the change is meant to end. Anyone opening the setting tomorrow would
think it had not taken effect. The table is a day old; what is lost is a
few ticks from trying it out.
What this costs is worth saying plainly: the silent case that could not
happen under exceptions can happen now. Do not tick a colleague and you
will not see her follow-ups — not while she is on holiday either. That is
the flip side of the decision, and it is written down in the migration
rather than discovered later.
Each note now says who wrote it. Own notes read "von mir" rather than
repeating your own name, which would sit on every second line and tell
nobody anything. The flag is computed on the server: the user id is
already there, and threading it through four components for one word is a
poor trade. The counter on the button follows the same turn — "+2" for
what you added, nothing when you added nothing.
Verified: 21 tests, five mutation-checked (restoring `not exists`,
dropping the own-notes clause, inverting the default, hiding the author,
and printing your own name instead of "von mir" each turn them red). 489
tests, typecheck, lint, schema drift and build clean. The migration is
reviewed but not run — no reachable database here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The bell is a shared pile: every active HR person sees every open note,
regardless of who wrote it. That was agreed and it stays the default —
this narrows it, it never widens it. You can now untick colleagues whose
notes you do not want to see.
What gets stored is the *exceptions*, not the selection. The difference
shows the day someone new joins HR: had the selection been stored, she
would be invisible to everyone until each person ticked her, and nobody
would notice her follow-ups piling up. This way she is visible from day
one and hiding her is a deliberate act. Same reasoning that made notes a
shared inbox in the first place — the silent gap is worse than a row too
many.
Own notes always come through: `note_mutes` rejects a self-reference, and
the predicate says so again rather than depending on a check constraint
staying put. Notes with no author come through too — hiding one because
nobody knows who wrote it is exactly the loss this list exists to prevent.
The rule lives in lib/notes.ts as one SQL expression because two places
need it: the bell in the header and the "Anstehend" card on the dashboard.
Two copies drift, and then the card counts something the bell does not
show.
No SQL function and no audit row, unlike anything that touches employee
data — this is a personal display preference, and an audit trail recording
every tick would make finding real changes harder. Same pattern as saved
reports and hire drafts, and the owner policy on note_mutes means a row
for someone else cannot be written even with invented values.
The checkbox flips immediately and flips back if saving fails; the list
gets clicked through several at a time and a round trip per tick feels
like hesitation.
Verified: 19 tests, five mutation-checked (or→and, dropping the own-notes
clause, inverting `not exists`, inverting the default, and losing the
email fallback each turn them red). Typecheck, lint, schema drift, 477
tests and the build are clean. Not seen in a browser: login goes through
the company account and the database is unreachable — the migration is
reviewed but has not been run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Beim Neuaufbau der Datenbank aus den Migrationen am 26.08. blieben
cost_centers, position_cost_centers, onboarding_tasks und
offboarding_tasks ohne Row Level Security: sie verlassen sich auf
den Ereignis-Trigger ensure_rls, den eine spaetere Migration erst
anlegt. Ein Ereignis-Trigger wirkt nur nach vorne.
Die Policies auf diesen Tabellen existieren und wurden nie
ausgewertet — PostgreSQL befragt sie nur bei eingeschaltetem RLS.
In jeder Aufstellung der Policies sah es richtig aus.
Der CI-Job prueft ab jetzt den Zustand nach dem Lauf, nicht nur
dass die Dateien durchlaufen. Genau in diesem Zwischenraum ist der
Fehler durchgekommen.
The database moved to a container of our own; the platform is gone.
This takes out what was left of it — and, where the leftovers were load
bearing, moves rather than deletes.
Moved, not deleted:
supabase/migrations/ -> db/migrations/ the schema's source of truth
supabase/build-org.ts -> scripts/build-org.ts
lib/supabase/types.ts -> lib/types.ts 52 import sites repointed
The bookkeeping needed care. It lived in `supabase_migrations.schema_migrations`,
and simply renaming the schema would have left the runner facing an empty
table: it would have called all 67 migrations pending and replayed them
against a database that is long since current. So the runner now creates
`migrationen.schema_migrations` and, once, copies the old rows across —
guarded so a second run does nothing and a fresh database skips it entirely.
Only then does migration 20260907100000 drop the old schema.
Deleted: the CLI config, the seed, the historical schema/function dumps
(nothing read them), scripts/umzug-von-supabase.sh (the move is done), and
both Supabase packages plus the CLI. Nothing in the application imported
them — the build now succeeds with no environment variables at all, which
is the proof.
Integration tests: six of them signed in through Supabase Auth and asserted
against the anon key and the service role. That model is gone, so the tests
were not portable — they are deleted. session-context and
employee-status-filter already ran on pg and are untouched; om-reporting is
ported to a direct connection because it guards a real risk (the reporting
line rule exists twice, once in SQL and once in TypeScript).
CI: the integration job started a Supabase stack. It now runs a postgres
service, applies deploy/db-init and every migration to an empty database —
that was the valuable part, and it still holds — then checks that a second
run is a no-op, which is what proves the bookkeeping works.
Docs: security-review.md audited a service-role key, a cookie adapter and
auth.users, none of which exist. Restating findings about removed components
would suggest today's system had been reviewed; it has not. It now records
what was removed and says a fresh review is due. data-model.md was already
marked obsolete and described the pre-OM schema; azure-migration.md was a
plan for a route not taken. Both deleted.
Verified: npm ci, typecheck, lint, 445 tests, build — all clean without the
packages. Integration tests skip cleanly with no database. Migration SQL and
the runner are reviewed but NOT executed: no Docker here, and the old
instance no longer resolves.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
