Remove Supabase

The database moved to a container of our own; the platform is gone.
This takes out what was left of it — and, where the leftovers were load
bearing, moves rather than deletes.

Moved, not deleted:

  supabase/migrations/  -> db/migrations/      the schema's source of truth
  supabase/build-org.ts -> scripts/build-org.ts
  lib/supabase/types.ts -> lib/types.ts        52 import sites repointed

The bookkeeping needed care. It lived in `supabase_migrations.schema_migrations`,
and simply renaming the schema would have left the runner facing an empty
table: it would have called all 67 migrations pending and replayed them
against a database that is long since current. So the runner now creates
`migrationen.schema_migrations` and, once, copies the old rows across —
guarded so a second run does nothing and a fresh database skips it entirely.
Only then does migration 20260907100000 drop the old schema.

Deleted: the CLI config, the seed, the historical schema/function dumps
(nothing read them), scripts/umzug-von-supabase.sh (the move is done), and
both Supabase packages plus the CLI. Nothing in the application imported
them — the build now succeeds with no environment variables at all, which
is the proof.

Integration tests: six of them signed in through Supabase Auth and asserted
against the anon key and the service role. That model is gone, so the tests
were not portable — they are deleted. session-context and
employee-status-filter already ran on pg and are untouched; om-reporting is
ported to a direct connection because it guards a real risk (the reporting
line rule exists twice, once in SQL and once in TypeScript).

CI: the integration job started a Supabase stack. It now runs a postgres
service, applies deploy/db-init and every migration to an empty database —
that was the valuable part, and it still holds — then checks that a second
run is a no-op, which is what proves the bookkeeping works.

Docs: security-review.md audited a service-role key, a cookie adapter and
auth.users, none of which exist. Restating findings about removed components
would suggest today's system had been reviewed; it has not. It now records
what was removed and says a fresh review is due. data-model.md was already
marked obsolete and described the pre-OM schema; azure-migration.md was a
plan for a route not taken. Both deleted.

Verified: npm ci, typecheck, lint, 445 tests, build — all clean without the
packages. Integration tests skip cleanly with no database. Migration SQL and
the runner are reviewed but NOT executed: no Docker here, and the old
instance no longer resolves.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

db/migrations/20260714120000_hr_only_access.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+-- HR-only access model (spec §2)
+--
+-- Rationale: the app previously had two profile roles (hr_admin / manager),
+-- with "manager" intended as a read-only, salary-masked role. The revised
+-- scope is HR-only: nobody except an active, explicitly-provisioned HR user
+-- may open the app at all. This migration:
+--   1. Collapses profiles.role to the single allowed value 'hr'.
+--   2. Adds profiles.is_active (default false — new users get zero access
+--      until an existing HR user explicitly activates them; see §2.3).
+--   3. Renames the authorization gate from is_hr_admin() to is_hr_user()
+--      (checks role='hr' AND is_active=true) to match §2.4's naming and
+--      semantics, and repoints every RLS policy at it.
+--   4. Fixes a real gap: several tables (divisions/departments/teams/
+--      locations, employee_history, positions, audit_log, reorg_scenarios/
+--      reorg_moves) had read policies scoped to `auth.role() = 'authenticated'`
+--      — i.e. ANY signed-in Supabase Auth user, not just HR. Every one of
+--      those is tightened to is_hr_user().
+--   5. Drops the employees_directory salary-masking view: with the
+--      "manager" role gone and salary out of MVP scope (see the salary
+--      deprecation migration), there is nothing left to mask and no second
+--      role to mask it from. All reads now go through the base `employees`
+--      table, gated by the same is_hr_user()-only policy as writes.
+--
+-- The application layer (app/(app)/layout.tsx) previously let any
+-- authenticated Supabase user reach the shell (it only checked for a
+-- session, not profiles.role/is_active) and merely hid the edit UI for
+-- non-admins. That check is being replaced in the app code alongside this
+-- migration — this migration is what makes that enforceable at the data
+-- layer regardless of what the UI does.
+
+-- ── profiles: single role, explicit activation ──────────────────────
+alter table profiles drop constraint if exists profiles_role_check;
+update profiles set role = 'hr' where role <> 'hr';
+alter table profiles add constraint profiles_role_check check (role = 'hr');
+alter table profiles alter column role set default 'hr';
+
+alter table profiles add column if not exists is_active boolean not null default false;
+alter table profiles add column if not exists created_by uuid references auth.users(id);
+alter table profiles add column if not exists updated_at timestamptz not null default now();
+
+-- Any *existing* profile row (i.e. someone already explicitly provisioned
+-- before this migration) keeps working — activation is only "off by
+-- default" for rows created from here on.
+update profiles set is_active = true where is_active = false;
+
+create or replace function fn_touch_profiles_updated_at()
+returns trigger language plpgsql as $$
+begin
+  new.updated_at = now();
+  return new;
+end;
+$$;
+
+drop trigger if exists trg_profiles_touch_updated_at on profiles;
+create trigger trg_profiles_touch_updated_at
+before update on profiles
+for each row execute function fn_touch_profiles_updated_at();
+
+-- ── Authorization gate: is_hr_user() replaces is_hr_admin() ─────────
+create or replace function is_hr_user()
+returns boolean
+language sql
+security definer
+set search_path = public
+stable
+as $$
+  select exists (
+    select 1 from profiles p where p.id = auth.uid() and p.role = 'hr' and p.is_active = true
+  );
+$$;
+
+create or replace function current_hr_user_id()
+returns uuid
+language sql
+security definer
+set search_path = public
+stable
+as $$
+  select p.id from profiles p where p.id = auth.uid() and p.role = 'hr' and p.is_active = true;
+$$;
+
+-- Back-compat shim so any not-yet-migrated call site (or a function defined
+-- in an older addendum file not touched by this migration) keeps working;
+-- new code should call is_hr_user() directly. Safe to drop once nothing
+-- references is_hr_admin() anymore (tracked in docs/decisions).
+create or replace function is_hr_admin()
+returns boolean
+language sql
+stable
+as $$
+  select is_hr_user();
+$$;
+
+create or replace function require_hr_admin()
+returns void language plpgsql as $$
+begin
+  if not is_hr_user() then
+    raise exception 'Nicht berechtigt: nur aktive HR-Benutzer:innen dürfen diese Aktion ausführen.';
+  end if;
+end;
+$$;
+
+-- ── Re-scope every "any authenticated user" read policy to HR-only ──
+drop policy if exists "org_read" on divisions;
+create policy "org_read" on divisions for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "org_write" on divisions;
+create policy "org_write" on divisions for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "org_read" on departments;
+create policy "org_read" on departments for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "org_write" on departments;
+create policy "org_write" on departments for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "org_read" on teams;
+create policy "org_read" on teams for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "org_write" on teams;
+create policy "org_write" on teams for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "org_read" on locations;
+create policy "org_read" on locations for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "org_write" on locations;
+create policy "org_write" on locations for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "history_read" on employee_history;
+create policy "history_read" on employee_history for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "history_insert_admin" on employee_history;
+create policy "history_insert_admin" on employee_history for insert with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "positions_read" on positions;
+create policy "positions_read" on positions for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "positions_write_admin" on positions;
+create policy "positions_write_admin" on positions for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "audit_read" on audit_log;
+create policy "audit_read" on audit_log for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "audit_insert_admin" on audit_log;
+create policy "audit_insert_admin" on audit_log for insert with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "reorg_scenarios_read" on reorg_scenarios;
+create policy "reorg_scenarios_read" on reorg_scenarios for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "reorg_scenarios_write_admin" on reorg_scenarios;
+create policy "reorg_scenarios_write_admin" on reorg_scenarios for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "reorg_moves_read" on reorg_moves;
+create policy "reorg_moves_read" on reorg_moves for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "reorg_moves_write_admin" on reorg_moves;
+create policy "reorg_moves_write_admin" on reorg_moves for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "employees_admin_all" on employees;
+create policy "employees_hr_all" on employees for all using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+-- profiles: users may always read their own row (needed to determine their
+-- own HR status before is_hr_user() would otherwise apply); HR manages all.
+drop policy if exists "profiles_select_admin" on profiles;
+create policy "profiles_select_admin" on profiles for select using (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "profiles_write_admin" on profiles;
+create policy "profiles_write_admin" on profiles for insert with check (is_hr_user());
+drop policy if exists "profiles_update_admin" on profiles;
+create policy "profiles_update_admin" on profiles for update using (is_hr_user()) with check (is_hr_user());
+
+-- hire_drafts / saved_reports stay owner-scoped (unchanged) — but an owner
+-- who is no longer an active HR user should not retain access either.
+drop policy if exists "hire_drafts_owner" on hire_drafts;
+create policy "hire_drafts_owner" on hire_drafts for all
+  using (created_by = auth.uid() and is_hr_user()) with check (created_by = auth.uid() and is_hr_user());
+
+drop policy if exists "saved_reports_owner" on saved_reports;
+create policy "saved_reports_owner" on saved_reports for all
+  using (created_by = auth.uid() and is_hr_user()) with check (created_by = auth.uid() and is_hr_user());
+
+-- ── Drop the salary-masking view: no second role left to mask from ──
+drop view if exists employees_directory;